



Religion and Communicative Rationality in Habermas

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Abstract. *The question of religion within the age of communicative rationality, as articulated by Jürgen Habermas, concerns the place of religion in modern societies increasingly founded on dialogue and rational communication among individuals. With the emergence of modernity, it was widely assumed that scientific and rational progress would lead to the decline of religion and its exclusion from the public sphere. However, the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas reconsiders this relationship, arguing that religion remains an important source of values and moral meanings that can enrich deliberation in the public sphere. He therefore advocates a form of coexistence between religious and secular discourse, whereby religion participates in societal dialogue on the condition that its ideas are translated into a shared rational language accessible to all citizens for understanding and debate. In this context, Habermas emphasises that contemporary societies are postsecular, acknowledging the enduring presence of religion alongside rationality and seeking a balance between them within a framework of dialogue and mutual understanding.*

Keywords: *communicative rationality, public sphere, religion, Post-Secular Society, Habermas*


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Received: 14 May 2025; Accepted: 2 September 2025; Published online: 28 May 2026

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Habermasda din və kommunikativ rasionallıq

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Xülasə. *Yurgen Habermasın ifadə etdiyi kimi, kommunikativ rasionallıq dövründə din məsələsi, getdikcə fərqlər arasında dialoq və rasionallıq əsaslanan müasir cəmiyyətlərdə dinin yeri ilə bağlıdır. Müasirliyin ortaya çıxması ilə elmi və rasionallıqın dinin tənəzzülünə və ictimai sahədən kənarlaşdırılmasına səbəb olacağı geniş şəkildə güman edilirdi. Lakin alman filosofu Yurgen Habermas bu əlaqəni yenidən nəzərdən keçirir və iddia edir ki, dinin ictimai sahədə müzakirəni zənginləşdirə biləcək dəyərlərin və mənəvi mənalara mühüm mənbəyi olaraq qalır. Buna görə də o, dinin ideyalarının bütün vətəndaşlar üçün anlaşılacaq və müzakirə üçün əlçatan olan ortaq rasionallıq dilə çevrilməsi şərti ilə ictimai dialoqda iştirak etdiyi dini və dünyəvi diskurs arasında birgə yaşayış formasını müdafiə edir.*

Bu kontekstdə Habermas müasir cəmiyyətlərin postsekulyar olduğunu vurğulayır, rasionallıqla yanaşı dinin də davamlı mövcudluğunu qəbul edir və dialoq və qarşılıqlı anlaşma çərçivəsində onlar arasında tarazlıq axtarır.

Açar sözlər: *kommunikativ rasionallıq, ictimai sfera, din, Post-Sekulyar Cəmiyyət, Habermas*

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Daxil oldu: 14 May 2025; Qəbul edildi: 2 Sentyabr 2025; Onlayn dərc edilib: 28 May 2026

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Introduction

The question of religion in the age of communicative rationality in Habermas constitutes one of the contemporary philosophical issues that has provoked extensive debate concerning the place of religion in modern societies. With the rise of modernity and the advancement of scientific rationality, many thinkers believed that religion would gradually recede from the public sphere, remaining a private, individual matter. The phenomenon of religion in the public sphere has attracted the attention of the leading figure of the second generation of the Frankfurt School of critical theory, Jürgen Habermas, who advanced a distinct perspective by seeking to rethink the relationship between religion and reason within the public sphere through his concept of communicative rationality, which is grounded in dialogue and mutual understanding among individuals.

Research

Moreover, Jürgen Habermas's positions regarding the role of religion in the public political sphere have generated considerable controversy among religious authorities in various countries, as well as among politicians, philosophers, business leaders, prominent theorists of political liberalism, and certain leftist thinkers. A preliminary examination of Habermas's oeuvre indicates the strong presence of the religious question in both his early and later theories. Before addressing the philosophical position framed by the theory of communicative action, which reconsiders the role of the political public sphere in comparison with his earlier theory, we provide an overview of his philosophical and political work in which he engaged with the religious question. On this basis, this article seeks to discuss the place of religion in Habermas's thought by clarifying the concept of communicative rationality, outlining his conception of the relationship between religion and the public sphere, and highlighting the role that religious discourse may play in contemporary societies.

Main Problem

How can religion maintain its presence and role in the public sphere under the dominance of communicative rationality as conceived by Habermas?

Subquestions

Does communicative rationality lead to the exclusion of religion from the public sphere or to a reformulation of its presence within it?

What conditions do Habermas establish for the participation of religious discourse in public debate?

Is it possible to reconcile religious discourse with secular discourse within a rational dialogical space?

The Concept of Communicative Rationality in Habermas

Habermas defines rationality as “what we call “rationality” is, first of all, the disposition demonstrated by subjects capable of speech and action to acquire and apply fallible knowledge.” (Habermas, 1995, p. 482) If modernity has culminated in what Habermas terms the differentiation between science, morality, and art, then restricting the concept of reason to philosophies of consciousness implies that consciousness represents only one aspect of rational activity. Habermas, therefore, sought to situate reason within a broader framework by introducing the communicative dimension into his renewed conception of rationality. This dimension enables interaction among individuals through linguistic communication oriented toward mutual understanding, in accordance with ethical rules governing the communicative process and agreed-upon standards. Through this, communicative rationality is attained.

Habermas considers this form of rationality to be a characteristic of postmetaphysical thought and sometimes refers to it as procedural rationality, that is, the rationality embodied in argumentative practice.

Habermas further distinguishes between strong and weak communicative action, a distinction he introduces in his work, *Truth and Justification* (Habermas, 2001, p. 56). From his overall elaboration on the differences between them, it can be inferred that he directly incorporates speech act theory into the theory of communicative action. He closely associates strong communicative action with illocutionary acts and with the communicative use of language, directly connected to the social world, grounded in the lifeworld, and composed of the shared values and norms among social actors. Hence, this model of communicative rationality seeks to achieve understanding and agreement among members of the communicative community concerning specific issues, since the attainment of such understanding constitutes one of the manifestations of the success of the speech act in Habermas’s framework.

In this regard, Habermas acknowledges the contribution of sociologists to the formulation of this new perspective on communication, stating that “the shift in perspective from purposive action to communicative action began with Mead and Durkheim; these thinkers, alongside Max Weber, belong to the founding generation of modern sociology.” (Habermas, 1987, p. 9) Habermas defines communicative actions as follows: “they are those actions in which the levels of action for participants in the communicative process are not connected to political imperatives, but rather to acts of understanding.” (Habermas, 1987, p. 10) There can be no understanding without language, which explains references by scholars of Habermas to his linguistic turn, a turn he himself acknowledges, and which led him to introduce language as a central factor in understanding communicative relations. To reinforce his conception of communicative action and to achieve a better understanding of social relations within society, Habermas maintains that communicative action is distinguished from other forms of action in that it does not seek the means to influence others but rather seeks to reach understanding with them and to achieve mutual agreement without coercion or constraint of any kind. Thus, the essence of rational communicative action lies in strong communicative action, insofar as the latter is immanent in communicative rationality, within which participants are allowed to critique the validity claims advanced by their interlocutors, in contrast to what occurs in weak communicative action.

The Critique of Instrumental Reason in Modern Societies

The term “instrumentality,” as employed by the early thinkers of the Frankfurt School, including Habermas, has two meanings: “the first represents a mode of viewing the world, while the second represents a mode of viewing theoretical knowledge. ” (Craib, 1999, p. 315) In his work *Technology*

and Ideology, Habermas argues that instrumental reason expresses instrumental rationality, which has played a significant role in shaping the features of Western capitalist society, insofar as it is a rationality subject to conscious calculation that examines how to achieve ends that are not in themselves governed by values but rather by a practical character. This type of rationality appears “in the human engagement with nature and is embodied in science, industry, and modern technology.” (Mosaddaq, 2005, p. 133)

Habermas further maintains that Marcuse's concept of instrumental reason, which coincides with the concept of technical or instrumental reason, is itself an ideology. In this sense, technology constitutes domination over both nature and human beings; thus, technology is a historical and social project that reflects what society and dominant interests seek to impose upon people and objects.

Habermas believed that science and technology have expanded to such an extent that they have become the most important productive forces. He seeks “to analyse the factors of incongruity between the results of a highly intensified rationality and goals devoid of vision, as well as rigid and heterogeneous value systems and a weak ideology, and to explore how technical decision-making authority might be restored to the consensus of citizens.” (Habermas, 1979, p. 170) By instrumental reason, Habermas refers to purposive reason, which may be either instrumental rationality or evaluative rationality, or both. Instrumental reasons are guided by technical rules grounded in empirical knowledge and achieve specific goals under clearly defined conditions.

Habermas emphasises that the concept of instrumental reason constitutes the clearest indication of the phenomenon of centring upon scientific-technical reason. He demonstrates how the development of scientific progress during the Enlightenment led to the emergence of this form of reason and clarifies the foundations that gave rise to instrumental reason, including the mechanisms established by the modern system, or more precisely, modern society (Hassan, 2009, p. 134). Habermas attempts to identify the general characteristics of instrumental reason and to demonstrate the reductionist manner in which it operates with respect to both nature and human beings. Instrumental reason views nature and reality from the perspective of uniformity and does not consider particularity. It also seeks to fragment reality into disconnected parts and regards the human being merely as a component analogous to material elements; for instrumental reasons, the human being is a fixed, quantifiable entity.

Communication and Dialogue in Habermas

In his philosophical project, Habermas relies on the linguistic dimension in accomplishing the process of communication, insofar as it constitutes “the instrument or medium of communication, as well as its content, material, and a priori criterion, given its inherent capacity for critique and the formation of norms.” (Al-Muhammadawi, 2011, p. 208) This is based on the consideration that language serves as a mediator that enables understanding and communication. He affirms that “if we wish to understand communicative action, we must presuppose language as the medium within which a form of understanding can be achieved.” (Habermas, 1984, p. 99)

Habermas justifies this position by arguing that our capacity for communication possesses a structure and fundamental rules that exist only within language, which all subjects learn and speak. The communicative experience is not merely the ability to produce sentences governed by rules, nor is it simply “a system of symbols with its grammar, lexicon, and phonetics, or with its semantic properties and diverse linguistic manifestations.” Rather, he also approaches language from the perspective of its pragmatic characteristics. “For him, language constitutes a system of rules that enables the generation of expressions to such an extent that every correctly formulated expression is considered an element of the language; consequently, subjects capable of employing these expressions participate

in communicative processes, since they are able to articulate, understand, and respond to sentences.” (Afaya, 1998, p. 198)

Within this framework, Habermas sought to avoid focusing solely on the speaker; instead, he endeavoured to formulate a theory that attends to both the speaker and the hearer, aiming to reach agreement. Thus, the success of communicative action in Habermas does not rest solely on what the speaker says or on the understanding of the speaker's utterance. He therefore introduces a highly significant additional factor, namely, the acceptance of the claim advanced by the speaker. "In communicative action, the outcome of the interaction itself depends upon the possibility that participants may reach agreement among themselves regarding a shared evaluation of their relations. According to this model of action, the only possible success of an interaction consists of the participants' attainment of a consensus, either affirming or rejecting the validity claims grounded in rational bases.” (Abu al-Sa‘ud, 2002, p. 111)

In this context, Habermas refers to what are termed “validity claims,” (Mosaddaq, 2005, p. 174) which, according to him, aim to connect speech acts with rationality. The acceptance of speech acts entails accepting validity claims or claims to truth, which must be fulfilled to achieve sound, unimpeded communication that leads to mutual understanding (Mosaddaq, 2005, pp. 145–146).

These claims are as follows:

Intelligibility: This is achieved through the production of a syntactically well-formed sentence that respects the rules of the language in use and remains compliant with its conditions so long as communication continues in a normal manner. Habermas considers intelligibility to be one of the enduring conditions of communication; it is not confined to an utterance that merely claims validity or contains the possibility of justification.

Truth: This refers to “the subjection of intersubjective utterance to standards produced by society through prior consensus, recognised and legitimate.” (Al-Muhammadawi, 2011, p. 203) This presupposition concerns the truth of the propositional content, which, insofar as it describes an existing state of affairs and is not derived from imagination, or, if it incorporates factual elements, as in the case of constative statements, ensures its truth.

Rightness: This entails recognising the correctness of the norm such that the use of words and expressions accords with the normative context established through the speech act in question. In other words, this presupposition concerns the validity of the utterance as a function of establishing a proper relation among individuals. This claim addresses the conformity of the linguistic act with the requirements of a previously recognised normative framework endorsed by society and characterised by the legitimacy of its standards.

Sincerity: “This presupposition is connected to the intentions of the speaker, which are assumed to be sound and well-intentioned; it enables the expression of the speaker’s intentions in a truthful manner, free from deception and falsehood, without sophistry.” (Mosaddaq, 2005, p. 146) This presupposition pertains to what is said insofar as it allows the speaker to express specific intentions sincerely, without distortion, falsehood, or rhetorical affectation, and without sophistry. It therefore requires that no doubt be cast upon the integrity of those engaged in the discussion and that the aim be honest and genuine rather than the obfuscation or diversion of the discussion from its true course. These conditions collectively function to determine and achieve the aims of understanding. They reflect our relation to the external natural world, the internal psychological world, and the lifeworld or the domains of social life. Each of these worlds has its own specific discourse, assigning to it the task of investigating the particular rationality appropriate to each domain. The internal subjective world requires an aesthetic discourse concerned with expressive norms, rhetoric, taste, and artistic

criteria; the natural world requires an empirical study that explains its phenomena and analyses their causes, whereas legal discourse is characterised by the study of social interaction and behavior within the course of everyday social life in accordance with prevailing norms and regulations (Mosaddaq, 2005, p. 132). Thus, it may be said that Habermas places the condition of acceptance or agreement on the part of the hearer on a par with the recognition of the validity claims advanced by the speaker. The hearer is entitled to challenge those validity claims, since the attainment of shared understanding presupposes that both the speaker and the hearer agree upon the publicly raised validity claims.

Characteristics of Communicative Rationality

Habermas proceeded from the need to fill the gaps he identified in critical theory, positioning himself as a defender of reason and rationality, which he regarded as the foundation for a new critical social theory. In pursuit of this objective, he found himself confronting the problems of modernity and the fate of modern reason, as well as engaging with all philosophical currents opposed to modernity, including those associated with so-called postmodernism and its deconstructive tendencies toward reason. He was thus compelled to respond to those who called for limiting the role of reason. He protested its dominance, instead advocated its activation rather than its restriction and advanced his well-known slogan: “modernity is an unfinished project”. The critique of reason by contemporary philosophical currents prompted Habermas to reformulate a new theory of rationality.

Moreover, Heidegger's philosophy, with its ontological analyses of the being of the human in the world and its being with others, also influenced him. However, rather than proceeding from consciousness towards “an interest in individual and collective consciousness and an attempt to uncover the capacity of this consciousness to determine modes of existence,” Habermas sought to establish the initial foundations that led him to aspire towards social emancipation from a sociological perspective, an aspect absent from Heidegger’s philosophy (Abu al-‘Aynayn, 1998, p. 56). Therefore, Habermas aimed to liberate social consciousness and to establish a theory grounded in human communication.

Religion in Modern Society, according to Habermas (Religion in the Context of Modernity and Secularism)

Recent scholarship confirms that Habermas’s position remains actively debated. Rhodin (2017) questions whether the translation proviso fully accommodates religious communication; Kaltsas (2019) connects Habermas’s postsecular public sphere with secularism and pluralism; Parmaksız (2021) proposes a falsificationist model for religious language in public debate; Finlayson (2021) clarifies the difference between Habermas’s institutional translation proviso and Rawls’s proviso; and McKenna (2024) and Sánchez Corrales (2024) examine concrete limits of translating religious meanings into secular vocabulary.

The growing rise of fundamentalist tendencies in contemporary conditions across all religious communities within human societies and their ability to extend their influence widely across different regions of the world has led thinkers such as John Rawls and Habermas to reflect on the dangers threatening liberalism and democracy, as well as their structures and teachings concerning shared social and political values. Rawls argued that the social contract can be realised only within the framework of reasonable doctrines accepted by the broader religious consensus in a manner consistent with the prevailing conditions of each human society. He further maintained that efforts undertaken to achieve this goal may result in the elimination of doctrines that do not conform to the rule of reason and logic (Rawls, 1993, p. 126).

Building upon this Rawlsian perspective, Habermas affirmed that “a liberal government that supports all forms of religious orientation equally, without privileging one doctrine or religion over another, is obliged not to compel religious citizens to conform to the principle of separating secular and religious norms in social and political life, since such compulsion would affect their religious identity.” (Habermas, 2008a, p. 130) For this reason, he proposed opening a tolerant democratic space in which there is neither coercion nor a single imposed choice between the religious and the liberal models.

The new dimension of the theory of the public sphere is reflected in the fact that Habermas’s initial work on the public sphere proceeded in the direction of restoring the role of the idea of the public use of reason, as defended by Kant at the end of the eighteenth century, wherein religion complements communicative reason rather than constituting its foundation. Although that work did not transcend the limits of bourgeois society and the exercise of political power within the field of social conflict, thus rendering it a renewed formulation of the critical (neo-Marxist) tradition of the Frankfurt School, Habermas emphasises the critical function of the public sphere in opposition to the totalising control of political authority over social relations. He conceives it as a mediator between the state and society. This instrumental conception derives from the modern political philosophical tradition, specifically from Hegel's conception of the function of civil society. However, Habermas establishes a clear distinction between the public sphere and civil society such that, in his view, the latter emerges from the depths of social relations as the most advanced level of the natural community (the family) while remaining in the service of the bourgeois state. Thus, it may be designated a bourgeois civil society. Jürgen Habermas also sought to highlight the pressing, contemporary problematic of the status of religion in modern societies, along with the interpretative demands that this presence and condition entail in relation to its intersections with politics, culture, and social conditions. To this end, he endeavoured to situate the discourse of modernity as a framework encompassing both religion and science, thereby constituting another major problematic of contemporary reason. Habermas acknowledges the existence of a condition of fundamentalism, which may be described as orthodoxy in both the East and the West, given that Jews, Christians, and Muslims alike suffer from extremism. In addressing this situation, he states, “Reason is capable of offering strategies or solutions to interpret and transform such behaviours; thus, we may rely upon reflection in this regard. In doing so, we do not exclude the religious other merely on account of difference from our inherited traditions because what they possess parallels the forms of intolerance and fundamentalism present within our own societies. This opens the way to addressing two issues: religion and secularism, and religion and the religious other.” (Habermas, 2006a, pp. 124–125)

Among the most significant contributions of Habermas in his examination of the force of religion in the public sphere is his conception of tolerance as the foundation of democratic culture, understood as a bidirectional process. Thus, “it is not only incumbent upon believers to show tolerance towards the beliefs of others, including those of nonbelievers and their convictions; rather, secular, nonreligious individuals are likewise obliged to appreciate the convictions of their fellow citizens who are motivated by religious commitments.” (Al-Muhammadawi, 2014, p. 3)

In the same context, Habermas attempts to demonstrate that the violence arising from fundamentalist religious practices and traditions is often constructed within such groups as a reaction to the injuries and suffering they attribute to Western civilisation, which they perceive as superior to them. Consequently, one observes the resurgence of global counterviolence in response to the persistent Western drive towards secularisation. To overcome the crisis of religious extremism and the contradictory relationship between religion and politics, or vice versa, Habermas maintains that the trajectory of solutions must turn toward the establishment of shared norms and the formation of a common sensibility. This requires transcending fundamentalism and monism and achieving religious pluralism and tolerance. Such a process must proceed through a communicative, intersubjective legal

and political network that offers a model of governance and legislation capable of engaging with religious thought as a constitutive element of many formal structures of contemporary society, including the foundations of legitimacy and ethics (Al-Muhammadawi, 2014, pp. 5–6).

Habermas thus regards the strength of religion in the public sphere in terms of its religious sources of meaning and motivation, viewing it as a supportive and even indispensable counterpart in confronting the forces of global capitalism, "while emphasising the decisive distinction between faith and knowledge." He further affirms that religious practices and perspectives remain essential sources of values that sustain the ethical life of multicultural citizenry, fostering both solidarity and mutual respect (Habermas et al., 2011, p. 64). Among the principal reasons Habermas advances for the return of religion is his insistence on the necessity for the law-making state to take into account representations including religious representations from all the cultures within its midst and to recognise for them a distinct space within what he terms the postsecular consciousness of society: a space in which each element is constituted in its own integrity and interacts with others on the basis of recognition and reciprocal respect.

The results of Habermas's analytical study indicate that religion can provide significant political support to all segments of democratic society. On this basis, religious discourse, in his view, remains alive and contains within it many authentic teachings that may serve as a fundamental source and reservoir for underpinning social concepts and refining human identity. " (Habermas, 2008a, p. 131) This, however, can be achieved only through translation, since, in his view, the religions known in the West are replete with parables, maxims, and enigmas that may not be readily understood by the general public, including politicians and diverse social groups with varying intellectual and cultural orientations.

The translation proposed by Habermas constitutes, for him, the formal gateway to entry into and participation in postsecular society, in which religious individuals are not compelled to relinquish their religious identity or ritual commitments. At the same time, they can present reasoned arguments and justifications that enable them to achieve practical success, thereby enabling humanity to arrive at a comprehensive model of justificatory liberalism. In this way, an inclusive democracy may be formed, one that fosters cohesion and harmony and enables the establishment of modern pluralistic governments free from any form of discrimination or serious ideological conflict.

Jürgen Habermas offered a distinct contribution, proceeding from the role of religion at the level of public reason in the postsecular age, a period characterised by a "transformation in consciousness," "as religion has re-emerged as a fundamental factor across various domains, including negative aspects such as the phenomenon of religious extremism and new religious wars, and positive aspects arising from the phenomenon of migration, which constitutes an important factor in the intermingling and interaction of cultures." (Habermas, 2008b, pp. 33–46) The most significant event, in Habermas's view, was 11 September 2001, particularly "the reaction it provoked through the invocation of opposing religious slogans." (Habermas, 2001)

Among the issues that also contribute to raising this topic is the development of the life sciences, which presents a dual challenge to both religion and politics, "especially the possibilities these sciences offer for intervention in the human genetic constitution prior to birth, with the resulting undermining of what is 'taken as humanly given at the ethical level,' (Habermas, 2002, p. 32) such as 'universality at the level of equality,' which provides 'in societies characterised by a plurality of worldviews, the only acceptable rational foundation for the normative regulation of conflicts.'" (Habermas, 2002, p. 151)

Here, we are confronted with a fundamental question that challenges free and just coexistence, since the concept of equality constitutes the basic principle of justice in the modern sense; if society seeks to preserve some aspect of the “meaning of humanity,” (Habermas, 1988, p. 23) which religions were originally endowed with value? This equality rests upon a deeper concept, namely, the individual in his or her individuality, which is one of the fundamental religious concepts. Habermas illustrates this with the following example: “On the last day, each of us appears alone, one after another, and no one can defend another; where the protection of earthly dignities and possessions is of no avail, we stand before the face of God the judge, subject to His will and, of course, to the justice of His judgement. Given the impossibility of one person substituting for another in bearing responsibility for the course of his or her personal life, each person expects equal treatment. On the basis of this abstraction of the form of the Last Judgement, the conceptual contexts of individuality and equality find their origins, and upon them also rest the comprehensive foundations of our constitution. ” (Habermas, 1987a, p. 120)

In this context, the role of religion, in Habermas’s view, emerges in light of new challenges, as it possesses a “capacity of reason,” insofar as “religious traditions have a distinctive expressive power that supports moral intuition, particularly with regard to sensitive forms of coexistence among human beings. This capacity renders religious discourse, in political matters, a serious candidate for a potential truth content that can be translated into the vocabulary of a particular religious community and into a language accessible to public deliberation.” (Habermas, 2005, p. 137) Accordingly, Habermas underscores the necessity of preserving the semantic potential of religion during foundational moments and major societal transformations. In adopting this position, he departs from Max Weber's view, which regarded religion as “inherently irrational and an authority opposed to reason. ” (Weber, 1988, p. 564) Thus, the “postsecular society” confers a new dimension on the relationship between religion and society, in which modern societies, despite their secularisation, do not disregard the rational potential inherent in religion.

Conclusion

Habermas maintains that modern societies are founded upon the principles of communication and dialogue among individuals, whereby laws and values are formed through rational deliberation within the public sphere. He designates this mode of thinking as communicative rationality, a form of rationality that is not based on domination or authority but on mutual understanding among participants in dialogue. Within this framework, religion is not entirely excluded; rather, it is regarded as an important source of values and meanings that can enrich public deliberation.

However, according to Habermas, the participation of religion in the public sphere requires certain conditions. Religious ideas must be translated into a shared, rational language to be intelligible to all citizens, whether believers or nonbelievers. This is what Habermas terms the translation of religious discourse into rational discourse open to discussion so that religion becomes a participant in democratic dialogue without imposing its beliefs on others.

Habermas further emphasises that contemporary societies are living in what he calls a postsecular society, one that recognises that religion has not disappeared as previously anticipated but continues to be present and influential in individuals' lives. He therefore calls for a complementary relationship between modern rationality and religious traditions, grounded in mutual respect and reciprocal learning between religious and secular discourse.

In conclusion, it is evident that Habermas does not advocate the exclusion of religion from the public sphere or its domination over it; rather, he seeks to establish a balance between religion and reason within a framework of dialogue and communication. Communicative rationality thus enables religion

to contribute to the construction of shared societal values on the condition that it remains open to rational debate and accepts the rules of mutual understanding. In this way, religion appears in Habermas's thought not as an obstacle to modernity but as an element capable of enriching the moral and human life of contemporary societies.

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